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THE RIGHT OF STATES TO USE 
ARMED FORCEt 
Oscar Schachter* 
When the United Nations (UN) Charter was adopted, it was generally 
considered to have outlawed war. States accepted the obligation to settle all 
disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the use or threat of use of 
force in their international relations. Only two exceptions were expressly 
allowed: force used in self-defense when an armed attack occurs, and 
armed action authorized by the UN Security Council as an enforcement 
measure. These provisions were seen by most observers as the heart of the 
Charter. and the most important principles of contemporary international 
law. They have been reaffirmed over and over again in unanimous declara-
tions of the United Nations, in treaties and in statements of political 
leaders. 
Yet as we are all acutely aware, there is widespread cynicism about their 
effect. Reality seems to mock them. Wars take place, countries are in-
vaded, armed force is used to topple governments, to seize territory, to 
avenge past iajustice, to impose settlements. Threats of force, open or im-
plicit, pervade the relations of states. The menace of a nuclear holocaust 
hangs over all nations, great or small. Collective security, as envisaged in 
the Charter, has had little practical effect. Our personal lives are deeply 
affected by the expectation of violence, by the vast resources devoted to 
armaments, and perhaps most insidiously, by the belief that little can be 
done to replace force as the ultimate arbiter in conflicts between nations. 
It is no wonder that the obligations of the Charter are widely seen as 
mere rhetoric, at best idealistic aspirations, or worse as providing a pretext 
or "cover" for aggression. This evaluation, devastating as it may appear for 
international law, cannot be dismissed or minimized. But there is the other 
aspect of reality. Never before in history has there been such widespread 
and well-founded recognition of the costs and horrors of war. That aware-
ness and its objective basis are powerful factors in strengthening the con-
scious self-interest in avoiding armed conflict. 
It does not follow, of course, that rules of law must be seen as an effec-
tive remedy. At the present time, peace is often perceived as "secured" by 
the balance of power between West and East and the deterrent effect of 
nuclear arms. It is widely maintained that these factors, not the legal rules 
of the UN Charter, are what count. But even if countervailing power and 
the fear of nuclear devastation are restraints on use of force, it is abun-
dantly clear that they have not prevented many armed conflicts, nor have 
t This Article is written in tribute to Professor Eric Stein, whose scholarship and wisdom 
have contributed greatly to our understanding of international law and international 
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they led to acceptance of a complete prohibition on the use of force. We do 
not, for our present purposes, have to consider in detail why this is so. It is 
sufficient to recognize that in numerous situations governments are not de-
terred from the use or threat of force by considerations of power, fear of 
destruction or, for that matter, by law. We generally attribute such deci-
sions to judgments of self-interest and rational assessments of probable 
gains and costs. We may also recognize that nonrational factors - emo-
tions, drives for power, ignorance - have an important role. There is 
rather more uncertainty about the influence of law and morality on such 
decisions. The reasons for this uncertainty do not arise from an absence of 
reference to legal and moral rules. On the contrary, every time a govern-
ment uses force or responds to such use by others, it invokes the law along 
with considerations of morality and humanity. This very fact generates 
cynicism since it seems possible for every action to find support in law and 
there appears to be no effective higher authority to settle the matter. These 
facts understandably lead many to conclude that the legal rules on the use 
of force may be used to rationalize and justify almost any use of force and, 
therefore, that they can have little if any influence on the actual decision to 
use force. 
One question raised by these observations is whether the existing rules 
on the use of force are so vague and uncertain as to allow a state to offer a 
plausible legal justification for virtually any use of force it chooses to exer-
cise. The present article is devoted primarily to providing a response to that 
question by analyzing the Charter rules and their application in recent 
cases. 
But before entering into a detailed analysis of the rules and their use, I 
would like to comment on a related question that is often raised. It is com-
monly said that the absence of an authoritative body to decide between 
conflicting positions objectively and to enforce them must mean that the 
rules, however clear their meaning, are only paper rules, in that they may 
be disregarded or violated to a degree that renders them no more than nom-
inal. This rather sweeping assertion requires further examination. We 
need to consider first the rather complicated situation regarding third-party 
judgments about the use of force. It is true that the absence of compulsory 
jurisdiction means that the International Court of Justice (or any other 
nonpolitical tribunal) is not available, in most cases, to decide the legality 
of the use of force. Exceptions occur, as in the case brought in 1949 before 
the Court by the United Kingdom against Albania concerning the use of 
force in the Corfu Channel. 1 The decision of the International Court of 
Justice in that case remains an important and authoritative ruling on the 
use of force. On the other hand, it is clear that the UN Security Council is 
competent under the Charter, particularly under article 39, to render a deci-
sion on whether an act of aggression has occurred. The Council is also 
empowered to adopt enforcement measures under chapter VII against an 
aggressor, or in fact against any state, if it considers such measures neces-
sary for peace and security. The authority of the Council applies to all 
states, whether or not they "consent" to it or participate in its proceedings. 
In that sense, the Council has compulsory jurisdiction. It is, therefore, a 
I. The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of Apr. 9). 
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body with formal authority to pass on violations of the rules on force and to 
enforce its decisions. Its legal authority is virtually unlimited except for the 
implicit requirement that it conform to the principles and purposes of the 
Charter. However, the Security Council can make decisions in non-
procedural matters only with the concurrence of the five permanent mem-
bers,2 a requirement which in practice has prevented the Council from 
reaching many decisions on charges that the Charter has been violated. 
The veto is a crucial factor - though not the only one - in the Council's 
failure to exercise the authority given to it under the Charter. 
The General Assembly, which may decide important questions by a 
two-thirds majority, has on occasion adopted decisions that involve judg-
ments on the use of force. These decisions are not binding under the Char-
ter. That does not mean that they lack "authority," for at least in some 
cases such resolutions will be regarded as expressing the "general will" of 
the international community and as persuasive evidence of legal obliga-
tion.3 It is true that their authority cannot be determined merely by the fact 
of their adoption. We would need a more complete assessment of many 
factors, including the intent and circumstances of the resolution's adoption, 
the composition of the supporting majority, the effect on state behavior 
both in the short and long run, the impact of attitudes of relevant publics, 
and so on. There is no simple generalization or formula that enables us to 
evaluate the effect of such General Assembly decisions, but it is sufficient 
for our present inquiry to note that they may be (and have been) treated as 
authoritative in the sense indicated. It may be asked whether a political 
body may have authority without power. Perhaps not, but in this context it 
is appropriate to consider their influence as an aspect of power. Thus, when 
the Assembly has condemned force as illegal in a particular case, its deci-
sion may be cited in opposition to that conduct by other governments and 
nongovernmental entities of some significance. Consider, for example, the 
effect of the resolution criticizing the use of force by the USSR in Afghani-
stan4 on the positions of Islamic countries and of some European commu-
nist parties which had previously been supportive of the Soviet position. 
One could not say that the resolution itself determined the attitude of these 
bodies, but the fact that it was used widely to underline and record the 
condemnation is evidence of its effect. At the very least, it was viewed as a 
political setback for the USSR with a potentially long-term negative effect 
on its claim as champion of national sovereignty. An effect of this kind is 
not always a consequence of a resolution, but it remains a significant indi-
cation that such resolutions may have impact irrespective of their formal 
legal authority. 
In sum, the UN political organs provide an institutional mechanism for 
authoritative judgments on the use of force, but only under some circum-
stances can they obtain the requisite authority and consequential behavior 
to endow their decisions with effective power. 
2. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3. 
3. See generally Schachter, Alf Ross Memorial Lecture: The Crisis of Legitimation in t/1e 
United Nations, 50 NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR INTL. RET. 3 (1981). 
4. G.A. Re.s. 37/37, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. 51 at 25, U.N. Doc. A/Res/37/37 (Jan. 18, 
1983). 
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We may carry our analysis of third-party judgments further by noting 
that such judgments are not only made in the UN international institutions. 
They are made as well in a variety of responses by governments and peo-
ples throughout the world. When force is used today in international rela-
tions, the issue of its legality and moral justification is invariably raised. 
Whether or not a UN organ can reach a decision, individual governments 
do take positions. Their positions may be expressed in a censure, and they 
may even take measures to impose sanctions on the offending government. 
Similarly, the public and influential nongovernmental organizations react 
in words and deeds. This was manifest in the reactions to the shooting 
down of the Korean civilian aircraft by the USSR in September, 1983, and 
the armed intervention by the United States~ Grenada in October, 1983.5 
One need only recall the criticism of force used in Hungary, Czechoslova-
kia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Angola, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Nicaragua to 
see that along with, or sometimes without, UN action, the ''world" in its 
diverse parts passes judgment on the legality of force and on the claims 
seeking to justify its use. Some would consider such judgments of minor 
significance because they do not effectively restrain illegal conduct. The 
question then is not whether we have authoritative judgments but whether 
such judgments are effective. Admittedly, judgments of illegality have not 
stopped states from continuing the use of force in several important cases. 
Nor can we assert with confidence that governments haye actually refrained 
from force because they expect such use to be declared illegal by others. 
But these observations do not fully respond to the question because they 
give too narrow a focus to the elements of decisions. 
If we take the realistic view that governments deciding on the use of 
force take into account the diverse considerations referred to earlier - the 
probable costs and benefits, the responses of other states and the public, the 
effect on future claims by other states, the value of law-compliance to inter-
national order - we may conclude that the issue of permissibility under the 
law is a factor that would normally be considered. That this is often the 
case is shown, at least in some degree, by the fact that in virtually every case 
the use of force is sought to be justified by reference to the accepted Charter 
rules. While such justification may be no more than a rationalization of an 
action chosen solely on grounds of interest and power, the felt need to issue 
a legal justification is not without importance. It demonstrates that states 
require a basis of legitimacy to justify their actions to their own citizens 
and, even more, to other states whose cooperation or acquiescence is de-
sired. The fact that claims of legitimacy are also self-serving does not mean 
that they do not influence conduct by the actors or by those to whom they 
are addressed. Even if we label those claims as hypocritical ("the tribute 
that vice pays to virtue"), they require credibility and for that reason must 
be confirmed by action. We need not treat this as a categorical imperative 
that holds good in every case in order to recognize that in a great many 
situations there is a link between conduct and the perceived restraints of 
law. Power and interest are not superseded by law, but law cannot be ex-
5. See, e.g., Documents concerning Korean Air Lines Incident, 22 INTL. LEGAL MATERIALS 
1109, 1220 (1983) {press release by the Intl. Fedn. of Air Line Pilots' Assns.). On Grenada, see 
note 26 infra. 
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eluded from the significant factors influencing the uses of power and the 
perception of interest. 
With these general observations on the relevance of law, I return to the 
first question I raised. Does international law lay down rules on the use 
and threat of force that are sufficiently clear and precise to enable judg-
ments to be made on the permissibility or im.permissibility of force? Or, 
alternatively, are the principles laid down in the UN Charter so vague and 
flexible as to enable states to advance a plausible legal basis for virtually 
any use of force? 
I. THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 2(4) 
The basic provision restricting the use of force (or its threat) in interna-
tional relations is article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter. It reads: 
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.6 
The paragraph is complex in its structure and nearly all of its key terms 
raise questions of interpretation. We know that the principle was intended 
to outlaw war in its classic sense, that is, the use of military force to acquire 
territory or other benefits from another state. Actually, the term "war" is 
not used in article 2(4). It had been used in the League of Nations Cove-
nant and in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, but it had become evident in 
the 1930's that states often engaged in hostilities without declaring war or 
calling it war.7 The term "force" was thus a more factual and wider word 
to embrace military action. 
"Force" has its own ambiguities. It can be used in a wide sense to em-
brace all types of coercion: economic, political, and psychological as well 
as physical. Governments represented in the United Nations have from 
time to time sought to give the prohibition in article 2(4) this wider mean-
ing, particularly to include economic measures that were said to be coer-
cive. Although support has been expressed by a great many states in the 
Third World for this wider notion, it has been strongly resisted by the West-
ern states. Other instruments (such as the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States)8 have been used to express opposition to economic coer-
cion directed against sovereign rights, with less emphasis placed on article 
2(4). The issue remains but it is marginal to the central problem with which 
article 2(4) is concerned: the use and threat of armed force. 
Even limited to armed force, the term raises questions of interpretation. 
Some center on the notion of "indirect" force. Is force used by a state when 
it provides arms to outside forces engaged in hostilities or when it trains 
troops? Does a state indirectly employ force when it allows its territory to 
be used by troops fighting in another country? These questions have tended 
to be treated under the rubric of "intervention," a concept which has often 
6. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. 
1. See Brown, Undeclared Wars, 33 AM. J. INTL, L. 538, 538-39 (1939). 
8. G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/Res/3281 
(XXIX) (1974). 
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been dealt with independently of article 2( 4) and defined as dictatorial in-
terference by a state in the affairs of another state.9 However, article 2(4) 
remains the most explicit Charter rule against intervention through armed 
force, indirect and direct, and it is pertinent to consider such action as fall-
ing within the scope of the prohibition. I shall therefore consider later the 
question of the indirect use of force by a state in hostilities between other 
states or internal conflicts. 
What is meant by a "threat of force" has received rather less considera-
tion. Clearly, a threat to use military action to coerce a state to make con-
cessions is forbidden. But in many situations the deployment of military 
forces or missiles has unstated aims and its effect is equivocal. The prepon-
derance of military strength in some states and their political relations with 
potential target states may justifiably lead to an inference of a threat of 
force against the political independence of the-target state. An examination 
of the particular circumstances is necessary to reach that conclusion, but the 
applicability of article 2(4) in principle can hardly be denied. Curiously, it 
has not been invoked much as an explicit prohibition of such implied 
threats. The explanation may lie in the subtleties of power relations and the 
difficulty of demonstrating coercive intent. Or perhaps more realistically, it 
may be a manifestation of the general recognition of and tolerance for dis-
parities of power and of their effect in maintaining the dominant and 
subordinate relationships between unequal states. Such toleration, how-
ever, wide as it may be, is not without limits. A blatant and direct threat of 
force, used to compel another state to yield territory or make substantial 
political concessions (not required by law), would have to be seen as illegal 
under article 2(4) if the words "threat of force" are to have any meaning. 
These interpretive questions concerning the meaning of "force" and 
"threat of force" are of importance in some situations and they indicate that 
the precise scope of the article requires further definition. However, they 
are essentially peripheral questions. They do not raise questions as to the 
core meaning of the prohibition and do not, therefore, require one to con-
clude that article 2( 4) lacks determinate content. 
A more basic question of interpretation is presented by the peculiar 
structure of the article. It is generally assumed that the prohibition was 
intended to preclude all use of force except that allowed as self-defense or 
authorized by the Security Council under chapter VII of the Charter. Yet 
the article was not drafted that way. The last twenty-three words contain 
qualifications. The article requires states to refrain from force or threat of 
force only when that is "against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any state" or "inconsistent with the purposes of the United Na-
tions." If these words are not redundant, they must qualify the all-inclusive 
prohibition against force. Just how far they do qualify the prohibition is 
difficult to determine from a textual analysis alone. 
This problem of interpretation has arisen in regard to two types of justi-
fication for use of force. One such justification concerns the use of force 
solely to vindicate or secure a legal right. Thus it has been claimed that a 
state is allowed to use force to secure its lawful passage through waters of 
9. l OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 305 (Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955). 
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an international strait or to compel compliance with an arbitral or judicial 
award. One may extend this to other cases where a state considers its rights 
to have been violated. The textual argument based on the qualifying clause 
of article 2(4) is that such force is not directed against the territorial integ-
rity or political independence of the target state nor is it inconsistent with 
UN purposes. In its simplest form, it is the argument that force for a "be-
nign" end does not fall within the qualifying language of article 2(4). 
This argument, in itself, has found very little support among govern-
ments or scholars. One obvious reason is that to accept it would deprive 
article 2(4) of much of its intended effect. States have numerous occasions 
when they consider, sometimes with clear justification, that their rights have 
been violated. The International Court of Justice in the Co,fu Channel 
Case of 1949, between Great ~ritain and Albania, squarely answered this 
argument by rejecting the British claim that it used naval force for mine-
sweeping in order to vindicate its legal right. 10 The court noted that 
notwithstanding its aim, the British action was a derogation of Albanian 
territorial sovereignty. It observed that such an alleged right to vindicate 
legal rights was the manifestation of a policy of force which "from the na-
ture of things" would be reserved for the most powerful states and might 
easily lead to "perverting the administration of international justice it-
self." 11 This decision was influential in countering any general interpreta-
tion that article 2(4) allowed force to secure legal rights. Whatever the 
intent;the fact that territorial sovereignty had been impaired was sufficient 
for the application of the rule against forcible intervention. It did not mat-
ter in the Co,fu Channel Case that derogation of territorial sovereignty was 
limited in time and limited to the aim of securing legal rights. 
A different conclusion is reached when a state uses force to resist illegal 
incursions into its territory. There is no question about the right of a terri-
torial sovereign to enforce its laws, with force if necessary, against an in-
truding vessel, plane or land vehicle that has violated the national domain. 
The use of such force is limited, not by the general language of article 2(4), 
but by customary law principles requiring that force be limited in manner 
and amount to that reasonable in the circumstances. 12 The sweeping prohi-
bition against force does not apply in such cases of "enforcement" by states, 
because the act of force does not fall within the proscribed categories of 
article 2(4). 
The Co,fu Channel Case, it may be noted, involved a claim of self-pro-
tection ( or self-help) rather than self-defense under article 51 or customary 
international law. The British minesweeping actually took place after the 
explosion of mines in Albanian waters had killed forty-four British sailors 
and damaged naval warships. The British did not charge Albania with an 
armed attack but with failure to remove the dangerous mines. The mine-
sweeping was said to be a self-help measure to obtain evidence to support 
the British claim for damages and therefore as an aid in administering jus-
10. The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of April 9). 
l l. The Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. at 35. 
12. Thus even apart from treaty obligations applicable to international aviation, it is an 
unreasonable use of force to shoot down a civilian airplane that has intruded on a state's 
territory and failed to heed instructions to land. 
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tice. 13 The court rejected such self-help because it violated Albanian sover-
eignty. No reference was made to self-defense. 
IL TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 
One of the most controversial issues concerning the meaning of article 
2(4) has arisen in some territorial disputes. In such cases, states have used 
force or have threatened force in order to take territory which they consid-
ered rightfully theirs. Their legal position in respect to article 2(4) has been 
that the use of force is not against the territorial integrity of the target state 
for the simple reason that the area taken by force is part of the state using 
the force. Thus, when in 1961 India sent its troops into Goa, then under 
Portuguese authority, it maintained that it was merely moving its troops 
into a part of India that had been under illegal domination for 450 years. 
The Indian representative in the Security Council said, "There is no legal 
frontier - there can be no legal frontier - between India and Goa."14 A 
similar argument was made by Argentina in 1982 in support of its use of 
troops to "recover" the Malvinas-Falkland Islands. 15 Iraq also took this 
position in 1981 to support its forcible attempt to regain an area it consid-
ered unlawfully taken by Iran in 1937.16 In all of these cases, article 2(4) 
was at least impliedly argued to be inapplicable on the ground that the 
forcible taking of the territory did not violate the other state's territorial 
integrity. It was not necessary on this theory to assert self-defense as a justi-
fication. Nevertheless, an argument based on self-defense was also made as 
a subsidiary point. It was contended that the allegedly illegal occupant had 
maintained his authority by armed force and that this should be regarded 
as a continuing "armed attack" against the rightful sovereign. 
In view of the considerable number of territorial disputes in the world at 
present, the claim that article 2(4) does not apply to the use of force to 
recover territory ( at least not by the rightful owner) would, if sustained, go a 
long way toward reducing the scope of the prohibition against force. It is 
therefore of some importance to consider whether the international commu-
nity, as a whole, has accepted the legal position asserted by Argentina, In-
. dia and Iraq. The record is not free of ambiguity. Many states expressed 
sympathy for the territorial claims advanced by the states using force. 
Some, like Venezuela and Guatemala, had similar irredentist claims. 
Others had political ties or strong anticolonial views. Nevertheless, a sub-
stantial number of them deplored the use of force and many among them 
asserted the inconsistency with article 2( 4).17 It cannot be said, therefore, 
13. The Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. at 34. 
14. 16 U.N. SCOR (987th mtg.) at 10-ll, U.N. Doc. S/PV.987 (l96l);seea/so L. HENKIN, 
R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 284 (1980). 
15. See generally Argentine statement in UN General Assembly, 37 U.N. GAOR (51st 
mtg.) at 7, U.N. Doc. A/37 /PY. 51 (prov. ed. 1982); see also J. GOEBEL, THE STRUGGLE FOR 
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (1982). 
16. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ, THE IRAQI-IRANIAN DIS· 
PUTE (1980); T. ISMAEL, IRAQ AND IRAN 24-27 (1982). 
17. See 37 U.N. GAOR (2363d mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/PV.2363 (prov. ed. 1982); see also 
Franck, .Dulce et .Decorum Est: The Strategic ~ole of Legal Principles in the Falklands War, 11 
AM. J. INTL. L. 109 (1983). 
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that most states would agree that the prohibition against force does not ap-
ply when a state seeks to recover territory that may be considered to have 
been illegally taken from it. Such cases are regarded by most states as dis-
putes which, under article 2(3) of the Charter, should be settled by peaceful 
means; even if such means are unsuccessful, there is no right to use force to 
rectify the wrong. Underlying this interpretation is a general awareness 
among governments that an exception for recovering "illegally occupied" 
territory would render article 2(4) nugatory in a large and important group 
of cases involving threats of force. 
To avoid the ambiguity arising from conflicting territorial claims, it 
would be useful to make clear in authoritative instruments that the expres-
sion "territorial integrity" in article 2( 4) refers to the state which actually 
exercises authority over the territory, irrespective of disputes as to the legal-
ity of that authority. A qualification to the generality of that rule would 
have to be made for situations in which actual authority over a disputed 
area has resulted from hostilities that are still taking place. In such cases, 
territorial sovereignty has not been established and therefore the use of 
force against the occupant should not be regarded as "against the territorial 
integrity" of the state. 
It is evident from the interpretation put forward that in cases of conflict-
ing territorial claims the prohibition against force is a strong normative sup-
port of the status quo. The aggrieved claimant finds "justice" sacrificed to 
"peace" especially when peaceful means of resolving the territorial issues 
have been exhausted or are futile. We are probably more conscious of this 
today than we were in 1945, when it seemed as though the United Nations 
and the International Court (supplemented perhaps by arbitral settlement) 
would be generally effective in resolving such disputes. That they have not 
been successful in the cases that burst into violence has undoubtedly influ-
enced the tendency to regard article 2(4) as an ineffective restraint. Clearly, 
article 2(4) cannot in itself restrain force when deeply felt rights to territory 
are claimed and peaceful means of dispute settlement have been unavail-
ing. Yet unfortunate as this may be it cannot be an argument for opening 
up a large exception to article 2(4). That would legitimize the use of force 
on a scale that cannot be tolerated when force tends to escalate and spread. 
On the whole, the international community has recognized this. The most 
recent events show no significant support among states for so far-reaching 
an exception to article 2( 4). 
Ill. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
Another broad exception to the prohibition in article 2(4), one for hu-
manitarian interventions, has been proposed by some international lawyers. 
The argument has been made that, in cases of large-scale atrocities or acute 
deprivation, armed intervention by outside states would be a justifiable ex-
ception to the article 2(4) prohibition.18 The argument rests not on the in-
terpretation of "territorial integrity" and the other qualifying phrases but 
18. See Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for Con• 
structive Alternatives, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 229-5 I (J. Moore ed. 
1974). For an opposing view, see Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL 
WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD, supra at 217-28. 
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on an overriding need to act in the interest of basic humanitarian values. It 
is accepted that such necessity arises only when effective peaceful measures 
are unavailable. The argument has a powerful emotional appeal, especially 
when large-scale genocide occurs or innocent persons are tortured or killed 
as hostages. The brutalities of the last decade have often seemed to cry out 
for effective humanitarian intervention through the use of force. 
Nonetheless, governments by and large (and most jurists) would not as-
sert a right to forcible intervention to protect the nationals of another coun-
try from atrocities carried out in that country. An exception was the 
intervention of Indian troops to protect Bengalis in East Pakistan during 
the 1971 civil war in Pakistan. India's ethnic links and the refugee influx 
into its own territory, as well as hostility toward Pakistan, were factors in-
fluencing its military intervention. It is interesting that despite considerable 
sympathy for the oppressed Bengalis, a large number of the UN General 
Assembly called on India to withdraw its forces. 19 
The relucta~ce of governments to legitimize foreign invasion in the in-
terest of humanitarianism is understandable in the light of past abuses by 
powerful states. States strong enough to intervene and sufficiently inter-
ested in doing so tend to have political motives. They have a strong temp-
tation to impose a political solution in their own national interest. Most 
governments are acutely sensitive to this danger and show no disposition to 
open article 2(4) up to a broad exception for humanitarian intervention by 
means of armed force. 
But a somewhat different position has been taken when a state has used 
force to rescue or protect its own nationals in imminent peril of injury in a 
foreign country. Such action has sometimes been called a type of humani-
tarian intervention, although it is much more circumscribed than the broad 
principle discussed above. Examples of such rescue of nationals in danger 
include: the Belgian action in Stanleyville in 1961, the U.S. moves in the 
Dominican Republic in 1965, the Israeli rescue effort in Entebbe, the unsuc-
cessful U.S. attempt in 1980 to liberate the hostages in Iran, and the more 
successful "rescue" of Americans in Grenada in 1983. In all these cases the 
use of force was criticized as a violation of territorial sovereignty, but jurists 
and many governments accepted a general legal justification for such use of 
force. 
The argument in favor of rescue attempts contains three elements: (1) 
an emergency need to save lives; (2) legitimate self-defense; and (3) non-
derogation of territorial integrity or political independence of the state in 
whose territory the action occurred. Waldock, writing in 1952, formulated 
the conditions under which a state may use force in another state, "as an 
aspect of self-defense," as follows: 
There must be (1) an imminent threat of injury to nationals, (2) a failure or 
inability on the part of the territorial sovereign to protect them and (3) 
measures of protection strictly confined to the object of protecting them 
19. GA Res. 2793 (XXVI), 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/Res/2973 
(XXVI) (1971). The resolution called on both India and Pakistan to withdraw troops from the 
other's territory but it was clearly directed against the Indian forces in East Pakistan. India 
strongly opposed the resolution but it was carried by 104 to 11. 
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against injury.20 
In a later exposition he stated: 
Cases of this form of armed intervention have been not infrequent in the 
past and, where not attended by suspicion of being a pretext for political 
pressure, have generally been regarded as justified by the sheer necessity of 
instant action to save the lives of innocent nationals, whom the local gov-
ernment is unable or unwilling to protect. 21 
The Israeli rescue action in Entebbe, Uganda, has been the clearest ex-
ample of the application of these principles, since there was no doubt as to 
the imminent peril of death of the Israeli captives, it was clear that the 
forcible capture was intended as an attack on Israel, and there was no rea-
son to consider the rescue as a pretext for political interference in 
Uganda.22 
The U.S. representative in the UN Security Council (then Governor 
Scranton) summed up the legal position, as he saw it, as follows: 
Israel's action in rescuing the hostages necessarily involved a temporary 
breach of the territorial integrity of Uganda. Normally such a breach 
would be impermissible under the Charter of the United Nations. How-
ever, there is a well-established right to use limited force for the protection 
of one's own nationals from an imminent threat of injury or death in a 
situation where the state in whose territory they are located either is un-
willing or unable to protect them. The right, flowing from the right of self-
defense, is limited to such use of force as is necessary and appropriate to 
protect threatened nationals from injury.23 
It may be noted that in three of the other cases, Stanleyville,24 the Do-
minican Republic,25 and Grenada,26 questions were raised whether the in-
terventions, though originally justified by necessity, became tainted with 
illegality through subsequent interference in the affairs of the territorial 
state. We need not explore the complexities of these charges beyond noting 
the issue of principle. Clearly, an action that may be legal in its inception 
20. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 
81 RECUEIL DES CouRS 451, 467 (1952). 
21. Waldock, General Course on Public International Law, 106 RECUElL DES COURS 1, 240 
(1962). 
22. See generally Green, Rescue at Entebbe - Legal Aspects, 6 ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS 312 (1976); Paust, Entehhe and Se!f-Help, 2 THE FLETCHER FORUM 86 (1978). 
23. 1976 DIGEST OF U.S. PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 150-51. 
24. 5 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 475 (1965). The Stanleyville rescue 
may have been authorized by the Central Government of the Congo (as it was then) but this 
was disputed. 
25. 12 M. WHITEMAN,supra note 24, at 733-49 (1971); Meeker, The Dominican Situation in 
the Perspective of International Law, 53 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE BULL. 60 (1965). 
26. See Statement of K.W. Dam, Deputy Secretary of State, to Committee on Foreign 
Affairs of U.S. House of Representatives, Nov. 2, 1983, excerpted in Leich, Contemporary Prac-
tice of the United States Relating to International Law, 78 AM. J. INTL. L. 200 (1984); see also 
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-6 (1983) (state-
ment of Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Secretary of State). The Grenada rescue also followed a 
request by the Governor-General of that country, but his authority to make that request was 
disputed. See Joyner,Rejlectionson the Lawfulness of Invasion, 78 AM. J. INTL. L. 131, 137-39 
(1984); Moore, Grenada and the International Double Standard, 78 AM. J. INTL. L. 145, 159-61 
(1984). 
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could become illegal through prolonged intervention. Dangers of abuse are 
an important consideration in adopting the position that such action may be 
taken only when there are no other means of protection and the peril is 
grave and imminent. Under this principle, one would have to reject the 
contention of the United Kingdom that its armed intervention in Egypt in 
1956 was a permissible intervention to protect its nationals.27 
The aborted U.S. attempt in 1980 to rescue the hostages in Tehran 
raised several questions as to its legality which merit consideration. Two 
relate to the requirement of necessity: namely, (1) had peaceful means been 
exhausted or were they still available? and (2) were the hostages in immi-
nent danger of losing their lives or suffering serious injury? 
It will be recalled that the hostages were seized in Tehran in November, 
1979, that the Security Council had adopted a resolution condemning the 
seizure as illegal and urging immediate release of the hostages, that the In-
ternational Court of Justice had issued an Order in December calling for 
release, and that efforts of various intermediaries and a UN Fact-Finding 
Commission had not succeeded in resolving the crisis.28 Iran ignored the 
Security Council resolution; it failed to cooperate with the UN Fact-Find-
ing Commission; and it refused to comply with the Order of the Interna-
tional Court of December 15th calling for the release of the hostages. 
However, the case was still before the International Court "on the merits" 
and the United States had pressed the Court for an early decision. One 
could plausibly maintain that this showed that peaceful means had not 
been exhausted at the time the United States undertook the military rescue 
action. But the critical question was whether the hostages were in imminent 
danger, notwithstanding judicial proceedings. It is not possible to answer 
this question even with hindsight. Yet it is not unreasonable to conclude 
that the United States could not be assured of the safety of the hostages 
simply because judicial proceedings were pending. The emotional atmos-
phere in Tehran and the public threats that the hostages might be executed 
were grounds for apprehension. The Iranian regime did nothing to allay 
the anxiety of the United States. Under these circumstances, it is hard to 
say that the U.S. military action was unnecessary simply because the Court 
case was still pending. As a matter of principle, exhaustion of remedies 
cannot be required when the "remedies" are likely to be futile. The state 
whose nationals are in peril must be given latitude to determine whether a 
rescue action is necessary; there is no international body or third party in a 
position to .make that judgment. The rescue action cannot therefore be 
characterized as illegal under international law. Whether it was wise in a 
political and military sense is a different matter. 
The U.S. use of force in Grenada was justified only in part as a rescue 
mission. The Americans on the island were not hostages and threats had 
not been made against them. Whether they would have been seized as hos-
tages to forestall a U.S. invasion or subjected to hostile military action re-
mains conjectural. Several U.S. Congressmen, at first skeptical, concluded, 
27. See w. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 339 
(1964). 
28. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 
(Judgment of May 24). 
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after a visit to the island, that there were reasonable grounds to have feared 
that the Americans were in danger.29 But most other countries did not find 
that a convincing ground and apparently considered it a pretext for the 
action. The condemnation of the United States by the General Assembly 
for flagrantly violating the Charter had the support of an overwhelming 
majority, including virtually all of the allies and usual supporters of the 
United States.30 If the U.S. action had been limited to an emergency rescue 
(on the Entebbe model), there surely would have been less doubt as to its 
justification. 
The fact that U.S. forces acted to expel Cubans and others and re-
mained on the island to restore "law and order" and democratic political 
institutions placed this action in a different light. Justification for those 
measures would have to be found in legal principles other than the protec-
tion of U.S. nationals. We will consider them below. The present question 
is whether these other grounds for the U.S. action vitiated the legality of the 
rescue action. As a matter of law and logic, they should not have done so. 
But they understandably contributed to skepticism as to whether the essen-
tial motive for the U.S. action was the emergency rescue and, in effect, 
subordinated that legal issue to the more controversial question of the con-
tinuing occupation. 
It has been maintained (as indicated in the quotations from Waldock 
and Scranton) that intervention to protect nationals can be self-defense, 
presumably on the premise that it involves an "armed attack" on the pro-
tecting state or an imminent threat of such attack. This has plausibility 
when the nationals are attacked because of political antagonism to their 
government (as in the Tehran hostages case). Reliance on self-defense as a 
legal ground for protecting nationals in emergency situations of peril proba-
bly reflects a reluctance to rely solely on the argument of humanitarian in-
tervention as an exception to article 2(4), or on the related point that such 
intervention is not "against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence" of the territorial state and not inconsistent with the Charter. Many 
governments attach importance to the principle that any forcible incursion 
into the territory of another state is a derogation of that state's territorial 
sovereignty and political independence, irrespective of the motive for such 
intervention or its long-term consequences.31 Accordingly, they tend to 
hold to the sweeping article 2( 4) prohibition against the use or threat of 
force, except where self-defense or Security Council enforcement action is 
involved. 
Before entering into an analysis of self-defense, I would revert to the 
question I put earlier in this paper, namely whether the prohibition in arti-
29. See Moore, supra note 26, at 149-50. 
30. G.A. Res. 38/7, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. 47, at 19, U.N. Doc. A/Res/38/7 (Nov. 3, 
1983); Joyner, supra note 26. 
31. See references to governmental positions in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND TH!l 
UNITED NATIONS (app. B, 209-19) (R. Lillich ed. 1973). Legal scholars opposed to forcible 
humanitarian intervention as a general e,cception to article 2(4) include: R. FALK, LEGAL OR• 
DER IN A VIOLENT WORLD 339 (1968); Brownlie, supra note 18; Giraud, L'lnterdiction du 
Recours a la Force, 61 REv. GEN. DR. INT. PUBL. 501, 512-13 (1963); Jimenez de Arechaga, 
General Course in Public International Law, 159 Hague Acad. Intl. L. Collected Courses I, 111-
16 (1978). 
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cle 2(4) is so uncertain or malleable as to allow states to construe it as they 
please. Admittedly, the article does not provide clear and precise answers to 
all the questions raised. Concepts such as "force," "threat of force" or 
"political independence" embrace a wide range of possible meanings. 
Their application to diverse circumstances involves choices as to these 
meanings and assessments of the behavior and intentions of various actors. 
Differences of opinion are often likely even among "disinterested" observ-
ers; they are even more likely among those involved or interested. But such 
divergences are not significantly different from those that arise with respect 
to almost all general legal principles. 
The foregoing analysis shows that article 2(4) has a reasonably clear 
core meaning. That core meaning has been spelled out in interpretive doc-
uments such as the Declaration of Principles of International Law, adopted 
unanimously by the General Assembly in 1970.32 The International Court 
and the writings of scholars reflect the wide area of agreement on its mean-
ing. It is therefore unwarranted to suggest that article 2( 4) lacks the deter-
minate content necessary to enable it to function as a legal rule of restraint. 
The very fact that states have turned to self-defense to justify the use of 
force indicates that the text of article 2( 4) is not so loose or uncertain as to 
allow credible self-serving interpretation in all cases. The question then 
arises whether self-defense provides a wide-open legal loophole in the pro-
hibition against force and whether its apparent availability as a legal justifi-
cation in recent cases has deprived article 2( 4) of much of its significance. 
The readiness of states to justify their use of force on the basis of self-
defense indicates the importance of defining that "inherent" right in order 
to limit the latitude of states to interpret it freely in their interest. In the 
comments that follow, we will consider the principal legal issues that have 
arisen in regard to legitimate self-defense. 
IV. THE REQUIREMENT OF AN ARMED AITACK AND 
ANTICIPATORY DEFENSE 
Our first question - whether self-defense requires an armed attack or 
whether it is permissible in anticipation of an attack - has given rise to 
much controversy among international lawyers. The text of article 51 does 
not answer the question directly. It declares that "[n]othing in the present 
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-de-
fense if an armed attack occurs." On one reading this means that self-de-
f ense is limited to cases of armed attack. An alternative reading holds that 
since the article is silent as to the right of self-defense under customary law 
(which goes beyond cases of armed attack), it should not be construed by 
implication to eliminate that right. The drafting history shows that article 
51 was intended to safeguard the Chapultepec Treaty which provided for 
collective defense in case of armed attack.33 The relevant commission re-
port of the San Francisco Conference declared "the use of arms in legiti-
32. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/Res/2625 
(XXV) (1970). 
33. See D. Bowrn, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 183 (1958). 
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mate self-defense remains ·admitted and unimpaired."34 It is therefore not 
implausible to interpret article 51 as leaving unimpaired the right of self-
defense as it existed prior to the Charter. The main interpretive difficulty 
with this is that the words "if an armed attack occurs" then become redun-
dant, a conclusion which should not be reached without convincing evi-
dence that such redundant use was in keeping with the drafters intention. 
The link with the Chapultepec Treaty provides a reason for the inclusion of 
the words "if an armed attack occurs" and explains why it was not said that 
self-defense is limited to cases of armed attack. 
Much of the debate in recent years has focused on the consequences of 
adopting one or the other interpretation, especially in the light of the appre-
hension over nuclear missiles. Even as far back as 1946, the U.S. Govern-
ment stated that the term "armed attack" should be defined to include not 
merely the dropping of a bomb but "certain steps in themselves preliminary 
to such action."35 In recent years, the fear that nuclear missiles, could, on 
the first strike, destroy the capability for defense and allow virtually no time 
for defense has appeared to many to render a requirement of armed attack 
unreasonable. States faced with a perceived danger of immediate attack, it 
is argued, cannot be expected to await the attack like sitting ducks.36 In 
response to this line of reasoning, others argue that the existence of nuclear 
missiles has made it even more important to maintain a legal barrier against 
preemptive strikes and anticipatory defense. It is conceded by them that 
states facing an imminent threat of attack will take defensive measures irre-
spective of the law, but it is preferable to have states make that choice gov-
erned by necessity than to adopt a principle that would make it easier for a 
state to launch an attack on the pretext of anticipatory defense.37 
Both of the foregoing positions express apprehensions that are reason-
able. It is important that the right of self-defense should not freely allow 
the use of force in anticipation of an attack or in response to a threat. At 
the same time, we must recognize that there may well be situations in which 
the imminence of an attack is so clear and the danger so great that defen-
sive action is essential for self-preservation. It does not seem to me that the 
law should leave such defense to a decision contra /egem. Nor does it ap-
pear necessary to read article 51 in that way - that is, to exclude com-
pletely legitimate self-defense in advance of an actual attack. In my view it 
is not clear that article 51 was intended to eliminate the customary law right 
of self-defense and it should not be given that effect. But we should avoid 
interpreting the customary law as if it broadly authorized preemptive 
strikes and anticipatory defense in response to threats. 
The conditions of the right of anticipatory defense under customary law 
were expressed generally in an eloquent formulation by the U.S. Secretary 
of State Daniel Webster in a diplomatic note to the British in 1842. The 
34. Id. at 182 (quoting Report of the Rapporteur of Committee I to Commission I, 6 
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 459 June 13, 1945). 
35. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 166-67 (1948) (quoting U.S. Memorandum No. 3 
of July 12, 1946). 
36. McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Se!f-.Defanse, 57 AM. J. INTL, L. 597 
(1963). 
37. See L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 141-45 (2d ed. 1979). 
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note responded to a British claim that they had a legal right to attack a 
vessel (the Caroline) on the American side of the Niagara River (in 1837) 
because the vessel carried armed men intending to use force to support an 
insurrection in Canada. Secretary Webster denied the "necessity" of self-
defense in those circumstances, asserting in his note that self-defense must 
be confined to cases in which "the necessity of that self-defence is instant, 
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberation."38 
The Webster formulation of self-defense is often cited as authoritative 
customary law. It cannot be said that the formulation reflects state practice 
(which was understandably murky on this point when war was legal), but it 
is safe to say it reflects a widespread desire to restrict the right of self-
defense when no attack has actually occurred. A recent case in point con-
cerns the Israeli bombing of a nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981, which the 
Israeli government sought to justify on the ground of self-defense. Israel 
cited the Iraqi position that it was at war with Israel and claimed that the 
reactor was intended for a nuclear strike. Many governments and the UN 
Security Council rejected the Israeli position. In the debates in the Security 
Council on this question, several delegates referred to the Caroline Case 
formulation of the right of anticipatory defense as an accepted statement of 
customary law.39 We may infer from these official statements recognition 
of the continued validity of an "inherent" right to use armed force in self-
defense prior to an actual attack but only where such an attack is imminent 
"leaving no moment for deliberation." 
V. THE REQUIREMENTS OF NECESSITY AND RECOURSE TO PEACEFUL 
MEANS 
The requirement of necessity for self-defense is not controversial as a 
general proposition. However, its application in particular cases calls for 
assessments of intentions and conditions bearing upon the likelihood of at-
tack or, if an attack has taken place, of the likelihood that peaceful means 
may be effective to restore peace and remove the attackers. As a matter of 
principle, there should be no quarrel with the proposition that force should 
not be considered necessary until peaceful measures have been found want-
ing or when they clearly would be futile. However, to require a state to 
allow an invasion to proceed without resistance on the ground that peaceful 
settlement should be sought first, would, in effect, nullify the right of self-
defense. One is compelled to conclude that a state being attacked is under a 
necessity of armed defense, irrespective of probabilities as to the effective-
ness of peaceful settlement. We reach a similar conclusion in the case of an 
imminent threat involving danger to the lives of persons coupled with un-
reasonable demands for concessions. It would be hard to deny the necessity 
for forcible action in that case on the ground that a peaceful means might 
succeed. 
The question of necessity was also at issue in the U.S. rescue action in 
38. 2 MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906); L. HENKIN, ,R. PUGH, 0. 
SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 890-91 (1980). 
39. 36 U.N. SCOR (2285-88th mtg.), U.N. Docs. S/PV.2285-88 (1981). 
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Iran in 1980. Let us assume for the present purpose that the attack on the 
U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the seizure of hostages was an armed attack 
on the United States. From the very outset, the United States was faced 
with the question whether an armed rescue action was necessary to liberate 
the hostages. For about six months (November, 1979 to April, 1980) the 
United States sought without success to bring about release of the hostages 
through peaceful means. The fact that such efforts were futile was cited as 
evidence that armed action was "necessary" to effectuate a rescue. Does 
this mean that any time after the seizure of the embassy and hostages, the 
United States was free to use armed force to liberate them? Note that the 
phrase "at any time" raises two separate questions. First, the question 
arises whether the attacked state has a right to use force immediately or 
soon after the attack or whether it must seek peaceful solutions first. This 
issue was clearly presented in the Tehran hostages case after the seizure.40 
The second question related to the timing of defense is whether the right 
remains available for a substantial period after the attack, where peaceful 
means have failed to achieve a solution acceptable to the attacked state. 
This issue was also presented by the Tehran hostages case and, in a much 
more far-reaching way, by the Argentine claim to a right to use armed 
force to recover the Malvinas-Falkland Islands. It is interesting that the 
issues concerning the "temporal" aspects of self-defense had received little 
attention in the legal writings prior to these events. They are of some im-
portance, as we can now see, and they merit further analysis. 
We can begin with the proposition that, when an attack occurs against a 
state (and I would include in that category attacks against state instrumen-
talities such as warships, planes and embassies), armed force may be used 
to repel the attack. Such force must, of course, be proportional (we will 
consider this requirement later) but except for very unusual circumstances 
the "necessity" of defense to an armed attack requires no separate justifica-
tion. It is enough for armed defense to be permissible that an attack take 
place. One could not say that a warship or a frontier guard is prohibited to 
repel an attack on the ground that there is no necessity for such defense 
because diplomatic steps might be taken to undo the wrong. There is no 
legal rule that a state must tum the other cheek because of its obligation 
under article 2(3) to seek peaceful settlement. 
The issue becomes more complicated if the attack succeeds in the cap-
ture of territory, property or persons. Must we then consider whether avail-
able peaceful means offer the possibility of a just solution and, if so, 
conclude that there is no necessity for armed force as defense? The answer 
may seem to be implied by the question - namely, if peaceful solutions are 
available, there would be no need for armed force to rectify the wrong. The 
logic may be compelling but experience suggests caution in accepting the 
full conclusion. History and common sense tell us that an aggressor, having 
seized the territory of people, might enjoy the fruits of his aggression while 
forestalling peaceful solutions through dilatory tactics or unreasonable con-
ditions. The absence of compulsory adjudication on a general basis may be 
cited as a reason for this, but even when compulsory judicial settlement is 
40. Schachter, Self Help in International Law: U.S. Action in the Iranian Hostage Crisis, 37 
J. INTL. AFF. 231 (Winter 1984). 
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legally required (as in the Tehran hostages case by virtue of treaties in 
force), it is possible for the recalcitrant state to avoid effective compliance. 
It is true that, under article 39 conditions, the Security Council may seek to 
bring about compliance by requiring the aggressor to yield up the fruits of 
his aggression and to provide reparations for his wrong, but the prevailing 
political differences and the requirement of unanimity of the permanent 
members of the Council render such enforcement measures unlikely. 
These considerations indicate the legal dilemma faced in cases where an 
attack has already occurred and the victim state has a choice between using 
force and seeking redress through peaceful means. In my view, a categori-
cal answer to the problem is not warranted. It would be unreasonable to 
lay down a principle that armed action in self-defense is never permissible 
as long as peaceful means are available. It would also be unreasonable to 
maintain that self-defense is always a right when an attack has occurred, 
irrespective of the availability of peaceful means or the time of attack. The 
difficulty in proposing a general rule does not mean that a reasonable an-
swer cannot be given in particular cases. In a case involving imminent dan-
ger to the lives of captured persons, as in Entebbe or arguably in Tehran, it 
would be unreasonable to maintain that the continued pursuit of peaceful 
measures must preclude armed rescue action. In contrast, the "necessity" of 
armed action to recover long-lost territory (as in the Malvinas-Falklands 
Case) does not have a similar justification. In such cases, there is no emer-
gency (as evidenced by the danger of irreparable injury), nor can it be said 
that all reasonable avenues of settlement have been exhausted. 
VI. THE REQUIREMENT OF PROPORTIONALITY 
Proportionality is closely linked to necessity as a requirement of self-
defense. Acts done in self-defense must not exceed in manner or aim the 
necessity provoking them. This general formula obviously leaves room for 
differences in particular cases. But uncertainties in some situations do not 
impair the essential validity of the principle or its practical application in 
many conflicts. Governments, by and large, observe the requirement when 
they are faced with isolated frontier attacks or naval incidents. The "de-
fending" state under attack generally limits itself to force proportionate to 
the attack; it does not bomb cities or launch an invasion. We tend to see 
such restraint generally as political or prudential, but that does not detract 
from its legal relevance. Thus, when defensive action is greatly in excess of 
the provocation, as measured by relative casualties or scale of weaponry, 
international opinion will more readily condemn such defense as illegally 
disproportionate. Some of the Security Council decisions that declared the 
use of force to be illegal reprisal rather than legitimate defense noted the 
much higher number of casualties resulting from the defense in relation to 
those caused by the earlier attack.41 
Geography may also be a significant factor in determining proportional-
ity. An isolated attack in one place - say, in a disputed territorial zone -
would not normally warrant a defensive action deep into the territory of the 
41. For a list and analysis of Security Council decisions on reprisals, see Bowett, Reprisals 
Involving Recourse to Anned Force, 66 AM. J. INTL. L. l, 33-36 (1972). 
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attacking state. However, the situation may change when a series of attacks 
in one area leads to the conclusion that defense requires a counterattack 
against the "source" of the attack on a scale that would deter future attacks. 
Thus, the United States responded to attacks on its naval vessels in the Gulf 
of Tonkin by strikes deep into North Vietnam.42 When Israel extended its 
"Peace for Galilee" action in 1982 deep into Lebanon rather than limiting it 
to a 40 kilometer zone (as originally announced), it asserted its right to self-
defense to eliminate the PLO in Beirut and other cities as the "source" of 
the continuing PLO attacks on northern Israel.43 International opinion, as 
expressed in the UN, rejected the Israeli contention.44 A contrary view 
maintained that the continued state of hostilities in the area and the de-
clared intent of the PLO and their governmental supporters to destroy 
Israel justified retaliation beyond the area of attack.45 
Whether or not the Israeli action was excessive in execution, it does not 
seem unreasonable, as a rule, to allow a state to retaliate beyond the imme-
diate area of attack, when that state has sufficient reason to expect a contin-
uation of attacks (with substantial military weapons) from the same source. 
Such action would not be "anticipatory" because prior attacks occurred; 
nor would it be a "reprisal" since its prime motive would be protective, not 
punitive. When a government treats an isolated incident of armed attack as 
a ground for retaliation with force, the action can only be justified as self-
defense when it can be reasonably regarded as a defense against a new at-
tack. Thus, "defensive retaliation" may be justified when a state has good 
reason to expect a series of attacks from the same source and such retalia-
tion serves as a deterrent or protective action. However, a reprisal for re-
venge or as a penalty ( or "lesson") would not be defensive. UN bodies or 
their states may legitimately condemn such retaliatory actions as violations 
of the Charter. 
VIL COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE 
The right of "collective self-defense," recognized in article 51, has given 
rise to much controversy among legal scholars, but it has nonetheless 
emerged as a major legal justification for military action by states outside of 
their own territories. It is also the declared legal basis of the principal mili-
tary alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, as well as a significant element 
in regional security arrangements. Some jurists (notably Kelsen) consid-
ered collective self-defense a contradiction because in their view the right of 
self-defense could only be the right of the attacked or threatened state.46 
Others (for example, Bowett) accepted the basic premise of self-defense as 
an individual right and concluded that collective self-defense properly ap-
42. Letter of President Johnson to Senator Jackson, Mar. I, 1967, reprinted in THE VJET• 
NAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 604-07 (Falk ed. 1968). 
43. Co=unication of Israel to Security Council, 37 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/15271 
(1982). 
44. U.N. Docs. S/Res 508, 509, 517 (1982); G.A. Res., U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-7/9 (Sept. 
24, 1982). 
45. See Levenfeld, Israeli Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon: Se!f-f)ejense and Reprisal 
Under Modern International Law, 21 CoLUM. J. TRANSNATL. L. I (1982), 
46. H. KELSEN, LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 792, 797 (1950). 
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plied only when two (or more) states act in concert for defense where each 
of them has been attacked.47 In contrast, if only one state has been attacked, 
another coming to its aid cannot be said to act in collective self-defense, but 
on the more dubious ground of a common duty to maintain international 
peace and security. 
This narrow view of collective self-defense is at variance with the posi-
tions taken by many governments in their declarations and treaties. When 
article 51 was adopted in 1945, it was intended to legitimize the security 
arrangement of the Chapultepec Act of 1941.48 That treaty declared, in 
effect, that aggression against one American state shall be considered an act 
of aggression against all. This was expressly referred to at the San Fran-
cisco conference as the reason for collective self-defense in article 51. 49 In 
1949 the North Atlantic Treaty provided that an armed attack on one or 
more parties would be an armed attack against them all and consequently 
that action might be taken in accordance with article 51. 50 Though Bowett 
has suggested that this still recognizes that the limits of article 51 must ap-
ply to the use of force (hence his view that there is no right of armed de-
fense unless that state is attacked or threatened), that interpretation does 
not seem consistent with the key provision that an attack on one is an attack 
on all. The Warsaw Pact follows the NATO Treaty in that respect.51 Thus, 
the two major military groupings are founded on a liberal interpretation of 
collective self-defense as allowing armed action by any member state when 
another member of the group is attacked. Bilateral treaties have also ap-
plied the concept of collective self-defense to undertakings by one state to 
come to the aid of another in case of aggression or armed attack. Such 
treaties do not require that the state providing aid to a victim of attack must 
itself be a victim. Moreover, some states have, from time to time, given aid 
to a government under attack by external forces when there was no existing 
treaty. In such cases (which have been rare) the two states have had polit-
ical and strategic links as well as a common perception that the attacking 
state was a threat to both. It is highly unlikely that state A would defend 
state B against an attacker C, unless A regarded Cs attack as a threat. 
We are bound to conclude that the collective security system of the UN 
Charter has now been largely replaced by the fragmented collective defense 
actions and alliances founded on article 51. When a state comes to the aid 
of another, the legal issue is not whether the assisting state has a right of 
individual defense but only whether the state receiving aid is the victim of 
an external attack. 
While NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization have a defined geo-
graphical scope and in that sense are regional, they are not "regional ar-
rangements" within the meaning of chapter VIII of the UN Charter and 
they do not inform the Security Council of their activities as required by 
article 54. The regional arrangements falling within chapter VIII include 
47. D. Bowm, supra note 33 at 216-18. 
48. Act of Chapultepec, 12 U.S. Dept. State Bull. No. 297 at 339 (Mar. 3, 1945). 
49. D. Bowett, supra note 33, at 215-216. 
50. North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241, T.I.A.S. No. 1964, 34 
U.N.T.S. 243. 
51. Warsaw Treaty, MaY. 14, 1955, art. 4, 219 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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such organizations as the Organization of American States, the Organiza-
tion of African Unity and the League of Arab States. With regard to the 
use of force, these treaty organizations may act under two separate grants of 
legal authority. They may take armed action in collective self-defense in 
case of armed attack on a member, whether that attack is by a state within 
or outside of the region. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assist-
ance of 1947 (the Rio Treaty) imposes an obligation on its parties to assist 
in meeting an attack on a member at the request of that member.52 The use 
of force in that event is legally based on the collective self-defense provision 
of the Charter. However, the treaty also provides that in cases of aggres-
sion, threats of aggression and situations that might endanger peace, the 
parties, through an Organ of Consultation, may take measures in the com-
mon defense to meet the danger. Such measures may include, in some cir-
cumstances, the use of armed force, even though the aggression is not an 
armed attack. Such measures would therefore not come within article 51 
but would instead be considered as "enforcement action" within the mean-
ing of article 53 of the UN Charter. Such enforcement action is permissi-
ble, but only if authorized by the UN Security Council. In the Cuban 
missile crisis of 1962, the crucial legal issue turned on this article. All states 
recognized the requirement of such authorization, though differing on 
whether Council "inaction" constituted an implicit authorization. The 
United States took the latter position with arguments that were less than 
convincing to most governments and legal commentators.53 
In the Grenada intervention of 1983, the United States responded to a 
request for assistance from members of the Organization of Eastern Carib-
bean States acting under various articles of their constituent treaty of 
1981.54 The OECS members noted the "anarchic conditions, the serious 
violations of human rights and bloodshed" on Grenada and "the conse-
quent unprecedented threat to the peace and security of the region created 
by the vacuum of authority in Grenada."55 They also declared that foreign 
military forces were likely .to be introduced and that "the country can be 
used as a staging post for acts of aggression against its members" and posed 
a threat to the "democratic institutions of the neighboring countries."56 The 
U.S. official statement referred to article 52 of the UN Charter and articles 
22 and 28 of the OAS Charter as relevant legal authority for the right of a 
regional security body to act to ensure regional peace and security. Conse-
quently, "in taking lawful collective action, the OECS countries were enti-
tled to call upon friendly states for appropriate assistance and it was lawful 
for the United States, Jamaica and Barbados to respond to this request."57 
The thesis that neighboring states may be entitled to use military force 
52. Rio Treaty, Sept. 2, 1947, art. 3, 62 Stat 1681, T.I.A.S. No. 324, 21 U.N.T.S. 77. 
53. A. CHA YES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1974); Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and the 
Law, 57 AM. J. INTL. L. 515 (1963); Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM, J. INTL. L. 546 
(1963). 
54. Treaty Establishing the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States, 20 INTL, LEOAL 
MATERIALS 1166 {1981). 
55. Dam, supra note 26, at 202. 
56. Id. at 202. 
57. Id. at 203. 
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- and to legitimize military force by others - in order to meet a threat to 
their security by a country perceived as potentially aggressive and danger-
ous to the peace goes far beyond the right of collective self-defense or inter-
national "peacekeeping" as generally understood. Such action would have 
been legally valid if undertaken pursuant to a Security Council decision 
under chapter VII. But a regional arrangement under chapter VIII (includ-
ing article 52) does not have the right to use armed force coercively, that is 
against another state, without prior authorization of the Security Council. 
To maintain that the U.S. action was legitimate because there was "a vac-
uum of authority" in Grenada (and hence "force" was not used against 
Grenada) assumes a right of other states to "police" other countries to re-
store law and order. One may concede that this may be done at the request 
of the country itself through a legitimate authority. But when armed force 
is used by outside states in the absence of such a request, it can only be 
considered a violation of the territorial sovereignty of that state and there-
fore inconsistent with article 2(4). That its purpose is benign and its effect 
on the country desirable would not constitute a legal justification under the 
Charter. If this conclusion is correct, the action in Grenada, insofar as it 
extended beyond the rescue of Americans, would only be legitimate on the 
ground that the United States and others responded to a request by the 
Governor-General who was then considered the "sole source of govern-
mental legitimacy on the island" after the violent overthrow of the previous 
regime.58 Whether such "invitations to intervene" are a sufficient legal ba-
sis for an outside state to use force will be considered in the next section on 
intervention in internal conflicts. 
VIII. INTERVENTIONS BY ARMED FORCE IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 
Foreign military interventions in civil wars have been so common in our 
day that the proclaimed rule of nonintervention may seem to have been 
stood on its head. Talleyrand?s cynical quip comes to mind: "non-inter-
vention is a word that has the same meaning as intervention." Indeed, vir-
tually all the interventions that occur today are carried out in the name of 
nonintervention; they are justified as responses to prior interventions by the 
other side. No state today would deny the basic principle that the people of 
a nation have the right, under international law, to decide for themselves 
what kind of government they want, and that this includes the right to re-
volt and to carry on armed conflict between competing groups. For a for-
eign state to support, with "force," one side or the other in an internal 
conflict, is to deprive the people in some measure of their right to decide the 
issue by themselves. It is, in terms of article 2( 4), a use of force against the 
political independence of the state engaged in civil war. 
The states that intervene do not challenge this legal principle; they gen-
erally proclaim it as the basis for their "counter-intervention." They are 
often able to do so with some plausibility, because in almost every civil war 
the parties have sought and received some outside military support. A pre-
eminent difficulty in applying the rule of nonintervention in these circum-
58. Id at 203. For conflicting views on the authority of the Governor-General, see Joyner, 
supra note 26, at 137-39, and Moore, supra note 26, at 159-61. 
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stances arises from the equivocal position of the established government. 
Other states are free as a general rule (in the absence of contrary treaties) to 
furnish arms, military training and even combat forces to that government 
at its request. On the other hand, they may not do the same for an opposing 
force; that would clearly violate the sovereignty and independence of the 
state. 
Consequently, governments commonly receive foreign military aid and 
they may request more such aid when faced with an armed insurrection. At 
that point two questions arise: (1) is there an obligation to cease aid to the 
established regime because that now involves taking sides in an internal 
conflict? And (2) if such aid to the government constitutes foreign interven-
tion, does it permit counter-intervention to support the other side? Con-
cretely, if the Nicaraguan Sandinista regime receives Cuban and Soviet 
military supplies and advisors, is the United States free to support the 
armed opposition by training, arms and technical advice? An answer to the 
first question involves an assessment of the particular circumstances and of 
the presumption that the government is entitled to continued aid. The rele-
vant general principle, in keeping with the concept of political indepen-
dence and non-intervention, would be that when an organized insurgency 
occurs on a large scale involving a substantial number of people or control 
over significant areas of the country, neither side, government or insur-
gency, should receive outside military aid.59 Such outside support would be 
contrary to the right of the people to decide the issue by their own means. 
It would be immaterial whether the insurgency was directed at overthrow of 
the government or at secession (or autonomy) of a territorial unit. 
The second and more difficult question is whether an illegal interven-
tion on one side permits outside states to give military aid to the other party 
(whether government or insurrectionists). Such counter-intervention may 
be justified as a defense of the independence of the state against foreign 
intervention; it may then be viewed as "collective self-defense" in response 
to armed attack. True, it may also further "internationalize" a local conflict 
and increase the threat to international peace. The Vietnam War is the 
outstanding example. Despite the danger, the law does not proscribe such 
counter-intervention. It is not that two wrongs make a right but that the 
grave violation of one right allows a defensive response.60 The political 
solution is to avoid its necessity by a strict application of a nonintervention 
rule applied to both sides. To achieve this it is probably essential in most 
cases to have international mechanisms (peacekeeping forces or observer 
teams) to monitor compliance with a cordon sanitaire and a ban on 
assistance. 61 
A related problem of practical importance is the clarification of what 
59. See Resolution of Institut de Droit International on the Principle of Non-Intervention 
in Civil Wars, 56 ANN. INST. DR. INT. 544-49 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Resolution on Non-
intervention]. 
60. John Stuart Mill made the point in 1859: "Intervention to enforce non-intervention is 
always rightful, always moral, if not always prudent." J.S. MILL,A Few Words on Non-inter-
vention, in 21 COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 109, 123 (J. Robson ed. 1984). 
61. On the role of the United Nations, see Schachter, The United Nations and Internal 
Conflict, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 401-45 (J. Moore ed. 1974). 
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kinds of military aid qualify as illicit intervention. The UN resolutions on 
nonintervention leave this to ad hoc judgments, but a strong case can be 
made for the specification of impermissible acts. Such specification would 
give more determinate content to the principle of nonintervention and, in 
that respect, strengthen it. In line with this view, the Institut de Droit Inter-
national, in its resolution on nonintervention, has designated the following 
acts as impermissible when done to support either party in a civil war: 
a) sending armed forces or military volunteers, instructors or techni-
cians to any party to a civil war, or allowing them to be sent or to set out; 
b) drawing up or training regular or irregular forces with a view to 
supporting any party to a civil war, or allowing them to be drawn up or 
trained; 
c) supplying weapons or other war material to any party to a civil 
war, or allowing them to be supplied; 
e) making their territories available to any party to a civil war, or 
allowing them to be used by any such party, as bases of operations or of 
supplies, as places of refuge, for the passage of regular or irregular forces, 
or for the transit of war material. The last mentioned prohibition includes 
transmitting military information to any of the parties.62 
The Institut also declared that outside states should use "all means to pre-
vent inhabitants of their territories, whether natives or aliens, from raising 
contingents and collecting equipment, from crossing the border or from em-
barking from their territories with a view to fomenting or causing a civil 
war."63 They also have a duty to disarm and intern any force of either party 
to a civil war which enters their territory. However, the Institut's resolution 
does not prohibit humanitarian aid for the benefit of victims of a civil war 
nor does it exclude economic or technical aid that is not likely to have a 
substantial impact on the outcome of a civil war. While it cannot be said 
that these declarations of the Institut are clearly existing law in every detail, 
they are a persuasive interpretation of the general rule against noninterven-
tion and should influence state practice. 
Two additional principles have been proposed for placing limits on 
counter-intervention. One is that the counter-intervention should be lim-
ited to the territory of the state where the civil war takes place. The fact 
that the prior intervention was illegal (i.e., in violation of the rule of non-
intervention) would not justify legally the use of force by a third state in the 
violator's territory. This territorial limitation on counter-intervention has 
been observed in nearly all recent civil wars. However, it apparently has 
been abandoned by the United States insofar as its "counter-intervention" 
on the side of the El Salvador regime has extended to support of anti-
Sandinista forces fighting on Nicaraguan soil. The United States had justi-
fied this action under the collective self-defense provision of article 51, pre-
sumably on the ground that Nicaragua has engaged in an armed attack on 
El Salvador. The United States also "counter-intervened" against Nicara-
gua by mining approaches to Nicaraguan ports. The legality of the U.S. 
actions has been challenged by Nicaragua in a case brought by it in April 
62. Resolution on Non-Intervention, supra note 59, art. 2, para. I. 
63. Id art. 2, para. 3. 
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1984 against the United States in the International Court of Justice.64 If the 
Court takes up the merits of the Nicaraguan complaint (overriding U.S. 
objections to the jurisdiction of the Court), it will have an opportunity to 
clarify the limits of collective self-defense and of counter-intervention 
under the UN charter. 
The second limitation arises from the principle of proportionality. It 
calls for limits on the technological level of weapons used in a counter-
intervention. This is essentially a no-first-use rule. High-technology weap-
ons of mass destruction should not be introduced into the internal conflict 
by any outside intervening state, whatever its right to intervene. On the 
whole, this rule of restraint has been followed in recent civil wars, though 
the Vietnam War involved exceptions. There is good reason to consider it 
as a legal restriction and not merely a prudential principle. It is, however, 
less clear that state practice conforms to a rule of proportionality in regard 
to the quantum of military aid on one side or the other. Proportionality 
would require some rough equivalence between the counter-intervention 
and the illicit aid given the other side. However, when an established re-
gime faces a strong indigenous insurgency which has some outside aid, the 
counter-intervening government favoring the regime is likely to be under 
great pressure to give massive support to that regime, even if relatively mi-
nor aid from the outside is given to the insurgents. U.S. military aid to El 
Salvador is a current example. It demonstr!J.tes the difficulty of applying a 
principle of proportionality in the absence of agreed limits by both sides on 
the quantum and character of outside aid.65 
A separate comment is called for by the kind of case presented by the 
request of the Governor-General of Grenada for military intervention by 
the United States and neighboring states. That request was premised on the 
"vacuum of authority" resulting from an attempted coup d'etat and a dan-
ger of foreign intervention. A factual question was raised as to whether the 
Governor-General made his request prior to the intervention or whether it 
was "concocted" after the invasion had been agreed upon and set in mo-
tion. 66 Another question was raised as to whether the Governor-General 
had the constitutional authority to make such a request. On both these 
64. The International Court issued an order indicating provisional measures on May 10, 
1984. It rejected the U.S. request to remove the case and left for future decision the question of 
jurisdiction or any question relating to the merits. The provisional measures ordered the U.S. 
to refrain from blocking access to Nicaraguan ports and from any military or paramilitary 
activities that '1eopardized" the sovereignty of Nicaragua in violation of international law on 
use of force and non-intervention. Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 169 (Order of·May 10, 1984), reprinted in 78 
Am. J. Intl. L. 750 (1984). 
65. Regrettably the report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America 
(Kissinger Commission) does not discuss international law or the principle of proportionality 
in regard to assistance to El Salvador. However, the Contadora group of Latin-American 
states has proposed reciprocal restraints on outside aid to both sides. See 38 U.N. SCOR 
(2437th mtg.) at 16, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2437 (May 19, 1983); Sec. Council Res. 530, U.N. Doc. 
S/Res/530 (May 19, 1983). 
66. Whether the Governor-General made the request prior to the invasion is disputed. 
The Economist (London) in a special report concluded that the "request was almost certainly a 
fabrication concocted between the OECS and Washington to calm the post-invasion diplo-
matic storm. As concoctions go, it was flimsy." THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 10-16, 1984, at 34. 
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points, there was reason to doubt that the Governor-General's "request" 
constituted an adequate legal justification for the armed intervention. How-
ever, apart from these questions specifically related to Grenada, there is the 
broader issue of principle concerning intervention on invitation of the gov-
ernment. We have already observed that authoritative legal opinion (mani-
fested in the above-mentioned resolution of the Institut de Droit 
International) considers that intervention on either side in a civil war inter-
feres with the right of the people to decide the issue for themselves. How-
ever, in th~ absence of a civil war, recognized governments have a right to 
receive external military assistance and outside states are free to furnish 
such aid. But a problem arises if such outside military force is used to im-
pose restrictions on the "political independence" of the country, as, for ex-
ample, by limiting the choice of the population in regard to the composition 
of the government or the policies it should follow. In such cases, we would 
conclude that the foreign armies, though invited by the government, are 
using military force to curtail the political independence of the state, and 
therefore it is an action that contravenes article 2(4). A different conclusion 
may be reached when a foreign force is invited by the government to help 
put down an attempted coup or to assist in restoring law and order. This 
would not violate article 2(4). Recent examples include French and British 
military support of African governments facing internal disorder. The line 
between the two situations may not always be easy to draw. An initial in-
tervention of a limited character may evolve into a more protracted use of 
foreign forces to repress internal democracy and political expression. There 
is good reason therefore to place a heavy burden on any foreign govern-
ment which intervenes with armed force even at the invitation of the consti-
tutional authority to demonstrate convincingly that its use of force has not 
infringed the right of the people to determine their political system and the 
composition of their government. It cannot be assumed that governments 
will, as a rule, invite foreign interventions that leave the people entirely free 
to make their own political determinations, though on occasion this may be 
the case. 
CONCLUSION 
Our survey of the law of force has looked at the "hard" cases, those in 
which sharp differences of judgment have arisen: Lebanon, Grenada, Falk-
lands, Nicaragua, the Tehran rescue attempt, and others. To some degree, 
these differences rest on conflicting interpretations of the agreed rules, and 
to a much larger extent, the differences arise from divergent perceptions of 
facts and motives. Yet underlying the disagreements, there is a considera-
ble area of agreement on the core substantive law. It would be a mistake to 
conclude that the international law of force is so vague and fragmentary as 
to allow governments almost unlimited latitude to use force. International 
texts and the legal positions taken by governments reveal a coherent body 
of principles that apply to a wide range of conduct involving armed force. 
These principles are grounded in two major interests, both widely accepted 
as basic to our international system. The first is the paramount interest in 
the sovereignty and independence of nation-states. The second is the com-
mon interest in restraints on the unbridled exercise of power. Such re-
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straints are no ,longer seen as "mere" ideals. The fear of nuclear war and 
mass destruction has made them a prime necessity for survival. 
It is true that the efficacy of law is limited because the system lacks 
effective central authority and is characterized by vast discrepancies in the 
power of states. Fear of nuclear devastation has not eliminated the 
Hobbesian element in that system. Powerful states may violate interna-
tional obligations; they may do so with relatiye impunity or they may pay a 
price. But they also have a stake in stability and an acute sense of counter-
vailing power. A decentralized legal system can operate because of these 
factors of self-interest and reciprocal reactions. 
Moreover, the system is not wholly decentralized. As we have indi-
cated, collective judgments are continuously being made both within and 
outside of formal institutions. Decisions of international bodies add both to 
the specificity and density of agreed law and affect the costs that result from 
illegitimate conduct. However inadequate this may seem in comparison to 
a mature national legal system, it should not be scorned as an element in 
maintaining peace. To consider its inadequacy a reason for ignoring the 
restraints can only add to the present insecurity. A world in which power 
and self-interest alone are expected to restrain force would not be a safer 
world. We may move dangerously in that direction by weakening existing 
law on the ground that it lacks impartial organs of application and enforce-
ment. The best would then become the enemy of the good. 
